This research investigates whether audit committees are associated with improved earnings quality for a sample of Australian listed companies prior to the introduction of mandatory audit committee requirements in 2003. Two measures of earnings quality are used based on models first developed by Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) .
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between audit committees and earnings quality in Australia. We examine two key aspects of this relation, audit committee formation and audit committee characteristics. We use measures of earnings quality based on models first developed by Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) . Measures based on the Jones "earnings management" model are generally characterised as capturing managements" intent to manipulate earnings, while measures based on Dechow and Dichev"s "accrual estimation error" model include accrual estimation errors arising from management lapses or environmental uncertainties.
Improved quality of financial reporting practices, and more specifically earnings, has been widely cited as one of the major benefits of companies establishing audit committees (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) et al., 2001; Ramsay, 2001) . However, the approach adopted by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 1 from the early 1990s to 2003 was one of disclosure only, requiring listed companies to provide statements about their main corporate governance practices, including whether they had an audit committee and if appropriate, why they did not comply with best practice guidelines. Audit committees only became mandatory in 2003 for those listed companies on the S & P All Ordinaries Index following the recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council 2 (ASX Corporate 1 Following the merger of the Australian Stock Exchange with the Sydney Future Exchange in 2006, the ASX became the Australian Securities Exchange. 2 A second edition of these recommendations was issued in 2007, but the 2003 edition applies to this study. Governance Council, 2003) . 3 Given the previous relative lack of audit committee regulation in Australia as compared to the US and other overseas jurisdictions 4 , pre-2003 Australia represents a rich empirical setting for the analysis of the association between audit committees and earnings quality. Davidson et al. (2005) and Koh et al. (2007) are the only known published studies to utilise this voluntary institutional setting to explore the relationship between audit committees and earnings quality. We extend their research in several ways. First, we capture earnings quality using measures of accrual estimation errors as well as abnormal accruals. The accrual estimation errors measure is a more comprehensive measure of earnings quality. We are not aware of any prior published research into the relationship between audit committees and earnings quality that uses measures based on Dechow and Dichev"s (2002) accrual estimation errors model. A comparison of our results between these two earnings quality measures allows us to investigate the potential impact of audit committees on different aspects of earnings quality. 5 Second, we examine whether earnings quality increases following the voluntary formation of an audit committee.
While several studies including Davidson et al. (2005) have examined whether the existence of an audit committee is associated with earnings quality, tests of this association do not differentiate between whether (a) the audit committee impacts earnings 3 In addition, entities in the top 300 of the Index are now required to comply with the ASX Corporate Governance Council"s best practice recommendations relating to the composition, operation and responsibility of the audit committee (Australian Stock Exchange, 2006) . 4 Audit committees have been mandatory on the major US stock exchanges since as early as 1978 (Vanasco, 1994) . More recently, there has been an increasing trend around the world towards requiring listed companies to not only establish audit committees, but also to ensure that they meet pre-specified requirements including composition and reporting obligations. For example, in the US following recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers changed their listing rules to require listed companies to maintain audit committees with at least three directors, all of whom are independent of management (Klein, 2003) . 5 Unpublished research by Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and Kent et al. (2008) use measures based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to capture accruals quality. However neither of these studies makes comparisons between measures of accruals quality and earnings management. quality or (b) firms with high quality earnings are more likely to form an audit committee. Overseas research (Wild, 1994; Jeon et al., 2004) has found mixed evidence about the impact of audit committee formation on earnings quality. Third, in addition to the audit committee characteristics examined by Davidson et al. (2005) and Koh et al. (2007) , we investigate the impact of audit committee expertise on earnings quality.
Recent unpublished work in the US by Dhaliwal et al. (2006) reports an association between audit committee accounting expertise and accruals quality. Finally, we use a more refined measure of audit committee independence than that used in prior Australian studies that investigate the association between audit committee characteristics and earnings quality (Davidson et al., 2005; Koh et al., 2007) .
Our results suggest that earnings quality increases in the year following voluntary audit committee formation. However this is only the case when earnings quality is captured using measures based on Jones" (1991) earning management model rather than Dechow and Dichev"s (2002) accrual estimation error model. This result appears to indicate that audit committees are effective in reducing intentional accrual manipulations, which are better captured by the Jones model. We also find differences in the associations between audit committee accounting expertise and the two earnings quality measures. When we capture earnings quality using accrual estimation errors, we find higher earnings quality (lower accrual estimation errors) for companies with a greater proportion of qualified accountants on their audit committee. However, we do not find a similar reduction in earnings management. Indeed, we find some evidence that suggests higher abnormal accruals for firms with a greater proportion of accounting expertise on their audit committee. Results pertaining to our other audit committee characteristics are similar to those found by Davidson et al. (2005) with the exception of audit committee independence. Using our more refined measure of independence, we find that this audit committee characteristic does not impact earnings quality.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the prior literature and hypotheses tested in this paper. Section 3 delineates our earnings quality measures, while Section 4 describes the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Prior literature and hypotheses

Audit committee formation
Several prior studies provide empirical support for a cross-sectional association between audit committees and financial reporting quality (e.g., McMullen, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 2000) . However, the research designs used in these prior studies are unable to establish whether the existence of an audit committee per se impacts earnings quality. For a more direct test of the impact of audit committees on earnings quality, it is necessary to consider changes in earnings quality subsequent to the formation of an audit committee.
The only known published study that directly examines the association between the formation of audit committees, earnings management and, inversely, earnings quality is Jeon et al. (2004) . Contrary to expectations, their findings indicate that earnings management did not significantly decrease in the period after audit committee formation.
These results conflict with those of Wild (1994) who finds a significant increase in the market's reaction to earnings reports released after audit committee formation.
We propose an association between the formation of an audit committee and an increase in earnings quality. Tests will allow a direct assessment of whether the voluntary formation of an audit committee is followed by an increase in earnings quality for our sample of Australian companies.
H1:
The formation of an audit committee is associated with an increase in earnings quality.
Audit committee characteristics Independence
The independence of an audit committee is often considered an essential characteristic influencing the committee"s effectiveness in overseeing the financial reporting process. It can be argued that independent directors are in the best position to serve as active overseers of the financial reporting process, thereby having a greater ability to withstand pressure from management to manipulate earnings (Klein, 2002) .
Audit committee independence has been found to be significantly associated with measures of earnings quality in several prior studies (e.g., Klein, 2002; Bedard et al., 2004; Choi et al., 2004; Van der Zahn and Tower, 2004; Davidson et al., 2005; Vafeas, 2005) . However, within these studies, there are some inconsistencies in the results. For example, Klein (2002) finds no evidence of a significant association between an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors and her measure of earnings management. Whereas, Bedard et al. (2004) find that the same measure of audit committee independence is negatively associated with the likelihood of aggressive earnings management.
Expertise
In addition to independence, the expertise of the audit committee is generally considered an important characteristic for its effective operation. It has been argued that effective oversight by an audit committee requires that its members possess sufficient expertise in accounting and auditing to independently assess the matters that are presented to them (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005) .
Several prior studies have found a significant association between the expertise of the audit committee and earnings quality (e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004; Choi et al., 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 2006) . However, some inconsistencies exist between the results of these studies and others such as Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) who failed to find an association between the magnitude of earnings management and the audit committee's financial expertise amongst the independent directors.
Activity and size
The level of activity of an audit committee has been recommended as important to enhance its effectiveness in improving earnings quality. Menon and Williams (1994) suggest that the mere formation of an audit committee does not mean that the committee is actually relied on by the board of directors to enhance its monitoring ability. Choi et al. (2004, p.41) argue that an "…actively functioning audit committee is more likely to detect earnings management than a dormant committee." In addition, the size of an audit committee can have a positive impact on earnings quality. Larger audit committees can be more effective as they are likely to include members with varied expertise to perform more intense monitoring of financial reporting practices . Inconsistent results in the prior studies also exist for the association between audit committee activity and earnings management or earnings quality. While Xie et al. (2003) , Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) and Vafeas (2005) find evidence of a significant association between these variables, Choi et al. (2004) , Bedard et al. (2004) and Davidson et al. (2005) find that audit committee activity is not significantly related to earnings management. Similar inconsistent results also exist in relation to the size of the audit committee. We use the following hypothesis:
H2: The independence, expertise, activity, and size of an audit committee are positively associated with earnings quality.
Earnings quality measures
Earnings quality vs earnings management
This paper uses two measures of earnings quality. The first measure uses a modified version of the Jones (1991) model of discretionary accruals. This measure has been widely used in the literature to capture earnings management, which can be viewed as an inverse measure of earnings quality. Schipper (1989, p. 92 ) defines earnings management as "…a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain." Under this perspective, opportunistic earnings management negatively impacts on the quality of earnings, i.e., the greater the earnings management, the lower the earnings quality. 6
Our second measure of earnings quality uses a modified version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual estimation errors model. This model is based on the argument that estimation errors in accruals and subsequent corrections of these errors decrease the 6 An alternative view is that earnings are managed to allow managers to reveal more private information to users about the financial reports (Schipper, 1989; Healey and Wahlen, 1999) . quality of accruals and earnings. However, unlike the Jones (1991) type models of discretionary accruals, no attempt is made to separate the intentional from the unintentional accrual estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) . This is because both types of errors imply low quality earnings.
Measures of Earnings Quality
We capture earnings quality using absolute value measures from the two models described below. The sign of these measures is deemed not to be relevant since all deviations from underlying earnings reduce earnings quality, regardless of their direction.
They are inverse measures of earnings quality. We use cross-sectional rather than timeseries specifications for each of our measures since we require measures of earnings quality for specific firm years. Information on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is used to form the industry matched samples required to calculate our earnings quality variables. To ensure sufficient degrees of freedom and enhance the validity of these measures, we limit our sample to companies in those industry groups that had 20 or more companies listed on the ASX. For companies in large industry groups, our industry matched samples comprise 30 companies.
Our first measure of earnings quality (EQJones) is based on the modified version of the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) . 7 We use cross-sectional samples of companies in the same industry groups as the sample companies. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is used as our first measure of earnings quality (EQJones).
It has been argued that there is the potential for discretionary accruals models to misclassify expected accruals as unexpected because of the incompleteness of the expected accruals model (Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Larcker and Richardson, 2004) . Guay et al. (1996) suggests that their evidence was consistent with the models estimating discretionary accruals with considerable imprecision and/or misspecification. Hansen (1999) concludes that studies relying entirely on the validity of discretionary accruals models were likely to under-or overstate proposed earnings management behaviour. Dechow et al. (1995) demonstrates that discretionary accruals models typically generated tests of low power for earnings management of economically plausible magnitudes.
In an attempt to overcome criticisms of the modified Jones model, we use an additional proxy for earnings quality. Our second measure of earnings quality (EQDD) uses the cross-sectional version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) We calculate EQDD by estimating the modified following regression for each sample company relative to its industry group of companies for each of the years of interest. All variables in equation (4) are divided by average total assets:
Where:
WC t = Working capital in year t i.e. Accounts receivable + Inventory -Accounts payable -Taxes payable + Other assets (net); However, we are not able to use the standard deviation of the residuals from our crosssectional industry model since this would provide a measure of earnings quality across all companies in the industry group rather than just the company of interest. Following Srinidhi and Gul (2007) who also need to capture this measure on a firm-year basis, we use the absolute value of the residual as our measure of earnings quality. The higher the absolute residual for each sample company, the lower is the quality of earnings.
Empirical analysis
Data and sample
The financial statement data items used to estimate our earnings quality measures are extracted from the Aspect Financial Database (SIRCA Ltd, 2004 Further deletions from our sample are needed for tests of the association between the formation of an audit committee and earnings quality (H1). In particular, we exclude companies for which we are unable to reliably determine the audit committee formation
year from annual reports. These comprise companies whose audit committees were formed prior to 1993 requirements to disclose audit committees in annual reports (80), those that listed on the ASX with an audit committee already in place (133), and those for which pre/post formation year annual report data is not available (24). This left a sample of 72 companies for tests of hypothesis one. Panel B of Table 2 shows the number of companies forming their audit committee by year. The higher numbers of formations during the 1994 to 1996 period suggest that the 1993 introduction of disclosure requirements provided an impetus for some companies to form an audit committee.
Audit committee formation and earnings quality
To determine the effect of audit committee formation on earnings quality, we compare our earnings quality measures between the years before and after each company"s audit committee was formed. Panel A of Table 3 shows the results of matched-pairs t-tests for significant differences for these accruals measures pre and post audit committee formation. 13 For the accruals levels variables derived from the modified Jones (1991) model, the mean for EQJones(post) (0.1370) is significantly less than the mean for EQJones(pre) (0.2033). This result suggests that earnings quality calculated based on the Jones (1991) model is significantly higher in the year after formation of the audit committees compared to the year before audit committee formation. These results support our first hypothesis that the formation of an audit committee is associated with an increase in earnings quality.
[ Insert table 3 here] However, the results for the measure of earnings quality based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model do not show a significant difference between the years before and after audit committee formation. Correlation coefficients between EQJones and EQDD are not significant (see Table 5 ), indicating that these two measures capture quite different aspects of earnings quality. It is possible that the observed change in EQJones between the pre and post formation years is due to factors other than the formation of the audit committee, such as changes in the board and auditor. To control for the impact of 13 A preliminary analysis of the distributions for our earnings quality variables revealed a small number of extreme outliers as well as positive skewness. Three extreme outliers are excluded from the analysis for EQJones, while one is excluded for EQDD. Wilcoxon signed ranks tests using the full sample yield the same inferences, as do sensitivity tests using logged transformations.
these potentially correlated omitted variables on the relationship between earnings quality and audit committee formation, the following pooled regression is estimated:
FORMATION is a dummy variable that equals zero in the pre formation year and one in the post formation year. Each of our control variables is measured in both the pre and post formation years. Return on assets (ROA) is included to control for potential changes in firm performance. It is possible that the observed increase in earnings quality could be associated with a change in firm performance. Prior research has shown that the measurement of discretionary accruals can be problematic for firms with extreme financial performance (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005) . It is also possible that changes to the board of directors or company auditor occurring at the same time that the audit committees were formed could be associated with the increase in earnings quality.
Hence, we include controls for board independence (BDIND), size (BDSIZE), accounting expertise (BDACCEX), legal expertise (BDLEGEX), meetings per year (BDMEET), and auditor quality (AUDITOR) for both the pre and post audit committee formation years.
Results of these pooled regressions are shown in Panel B of not because of a government requirement, are likely to be more effective at constraining earnings management and therefore improving earnings quality. This is because they have other incentives to ensure their audit committees operate effectively, which also drive the decision to voluntarily form an audit committee. EQJones are similar to those reported by Davidson et al. (2005) for their absolute discretionary accruals measure that is based on the same cross-sectional modified Jones model that we use. We exclude several outliers for EQJones and EQDD from our primary analysis and also report results of sensitivity analysis using logged transformations of our earnings quality measures.
Audit committee characteristics and earnings quality
Overall, the descriptive statistics indicate that there is considerable variation in the audit committee variables for the sample companies. The mean proportion of independent directors on the audit committee is 0.53. Prior US studies such as Yang and Krishnan (2005) provide evidence that audit committees in the United States have much higher proportions of independent directors, which reflects the greater degree of audit committee regulation. Our measures of ACMEET and ACSIZE are slightly higher than those reported by Davidson et al. (2005) . This is most likely due to the larger average size of the firms in our sample and the exclusion of firms without an audit committee from our sample. Descriptive statistics for full board level variables that correspond to our audit committee variables are also shown in Table 4 . Davidson et al. (2005) and Koh et al. (2007) found board independence to impact earnings quality. It is likely that some of the other board level variables are also associated with earnings quality. The remaining variables in Table 4 When we consider EQDD, Pearson correlations show significant negative relationships between this measure of earnings quality and ACACCEX, ACSIZE, BDSIZE, LNTA, and a significant positive relation with LOSS. Spearman correlations support these results and also show a significant positive relation between EQDD and LNOC. When we use a log transformation of EQDD, the same variables remain significant. These results indicate initial support for the predicted H2 relations between earnings quality and audit committee size and accounting expertise.
Not surprisingly, most of our audit committee and full board level variables are very highly correlated; with the correlation coefficients for the independence and expertise measures ranging between 0.69 and 0.78. Further, audit committee size is significantly positively correlated with full board size and firm size. Interestingly, the two measures of audit committee expertise (ACACCEX and ACLEGEX) are significantly negatively correlated with each other. This suggests that the two forms of expertise are substitutes for each other.
We use the following regression model to test our second hypothesis that earnings quality is positively associated with audit committee independence, expertise, activity and size. EQ denotes the two earnings quality measures described above (EQJones and EQDD). This model is estimated on our sample of listed Australian companies in 2001:
In addition, we run the above model substituting a series of industry dummy variables for LNOC. This allows us to use a larger sample since we were able to collect data about industry membership for all of our sample firms, while we were only able to obtain operating cycle data for 284 of our sample firms. We rerun this model controlling for full board independence, expertise, activity and size. Several of these variables are significantly positively correlated with their corresponding audit committee measures and that is why we exclude them from equation 6. However, some of these board variables are significantly associated with our EQ measures and we therefore attempt to control for their impact by including them in a sensitivity test of this model. When logged transformations of our EQ variables are used, EQDD remains significantly negatively associated with ACACCEX, while EQJones is significantly 15 These authors proxy audit committee independence using a dichotomous non-executive director measure and find mixed results depending on whether they code this variable with a value of one if the audit committee is comprised entirely of non-executive directors or a majority. In sensitivity tests, their significant results for this variable become insignificant when they remove non-executive directors that had related party transactions. 16 We also examine a summary measure of the overall strength of the sample companies' audit committees. This variable (AC_GOV_SCORE) is calculated as the sum of each of the audit committee dichotomous variables discussed above. There is a significant negative Pearson correlation between AC_GOV_SCORE and EQDD. However, this relation is not significant in a multivariate context. positively associated with this variable. When we add the full board variables to our models, the relationship between EQDD and ACACCEX becomes insignificant and the remainder of our results are qualitatively the same. Given the high correlation between our board and audit committee accounting expertise variables (r = 0.77), it is difficult to reliably interpret this result. We therefore rerun our EQDD models with BDACCEX instead of ACACCEX and find that BDACCEX is not significantly related to EQDD.
This result suggests that it is accounting expertise at the audit committee level rather than the full board level that positively impacts earnings quality.
The results for control variables shown in table 6 indicate significant associations between EQDD and LNTA, and between EQJones and LNTA and AUDITOR, as well as some mixed results for LEV, LOSS and LNOC. The significant positive relations that we observe between EQJones and ACACCEX and AUDITOR are contrary to expectations.
Several of the industry dummy variables are significant for EQJones, which captures variation in the exercise of discretionary accruals across industries.
Overall, H2 is generally not supported, with the exception of audit committee accounting expertise when the EQDD measure of earnings quality is considered. The weight of evidence suggests that the higher the proportion of accounting expertise a company has on its audit committee, the lower its accrual estimation errors.
Conclusions
This research investigates the association between audit committees and earnings quality in Australia. The time period for the research is selected to avoid the confounding effects of mandatory audit committee requirements introduced for Australian companies in 2003. We hypothesise that the formation of an audit committee is associated with an increase in earnings quality (H1); and the independence, expertise, activity, and size of an audit committee are positively associated with earnings quality (H2). Overall, the results provide support for H1, but not H2.
Several conclusions can be drawn from our results. First, we find that a discretionary accruals measure based on the Jones (1991) earnings management model, decreases significantly in the year following audit committee formation. Since measures based on this model are generally characterised as capturing managements" intent to manipulate earnings, our results imply that the establishment of an audit committee is an effective way to reduce earnings management, and hence improve the quality of earnings.
When we capture accrual estimation errors using measures based on Dechow and Dichev"s (2002) model, we do not find an increase in earnings quality following audit committee formation. This disparity in results between the two types of earnings quality measures highlights the potential impact of audit committees. While improved quality of financial reporting practices has been widely cited as a major benefit of audit committees, this result appears to indicate that this improvement most likely occurs through a reduction in earnings manipulations rather than lower accrual estimation errors deriving from management lapses or environmental uncertainties. A caveat on these results is the relatively small sample size available for tests of H1.
Second, when we capture earnings quality using an accrual estimation errors measure, we find that audit committee accounting expertise is associated with higher quality earnings. However we do not find the same association when we capture earnings quality using an earnings management measure. Indeed, we find some evidence of higher earnings management for firms with a greater proportion of qualified accountants on their audit committees. Future research that explores this result further may be able to shed some light on this unexpected finding. A potential limitation of our research relates to the endogeneity of audit committees. The characteristics of audit committees are not necessarily independent of earnings quality. Companies with higher quality earnings may be more likely to choose audit committee characteristics that signal the strength of their financial reporting system (Engel, 2005) .
Overall, our results highlight the multifaceted nature of earnings quality and the potential for audit committees to impact it. As we have found, different measures of earnings quality can lead to different results and inferences. Each of the available models of earnings quality has its own particular limitations and these should be considered when interpreting our results. Additional research that separates out the intentional and unintentional components of the accrual estimation errors would help to further clarify which aspects of earnings quality audit committees tend to improve. 142 * significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level (p-values are one-tailed) EQJones = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) EQDD = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) FORMATION: 1 = year after audit committee formation; 0 = year before audit committee formation ROA = Return on assets calculated as operating profit after tax scaled by average total assets BDIND = Proportion of independent directors on the board BDSIZE = Number of board members BDACCEX = Proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications BDLEGEX = Proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications BDMEET = Number of board meetings per annum AUDITOR: 1 = Big 5 or 6 auditor; 0 = Non-big 5 or 6 auditor Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
